ABSTRACT
Introduction
Monetary aggregates control is commonly used as an intermediate goal of monetary policy because monetary targets have long been considered as an approximate means to communicate longer run policy objectives to the general public. Anchoring exchange rates, on the other hand, is also of utmost importance to the disinflation process in open economies. By keeping exchange rate within given margins around a central parity, an inflation-prone country could "borrow" the low inflation reputation of a foreign country. Examples include France's targeting Deutsche Mark before the inception of the European Central Bank.
France started to participate in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1979. The decision to join an exchange rate target zone was a powerful incentive to disinflation. However, as illustrated in Neely (1994) , the target zone of the Franc/Deutsche Mark exchange rates was realigned six times from 1979 to 1987. Such lack of credibility on target values failed to build a reputation for price stability. During this period, French monetary authority resorted to devaluation to boost growth. Businesses relied on the devaluation and had little incentive to increase their competitiveness. However, the growth obtained through devaluation was merely an illusion because of the depreciation of domestic currency. Furthermore, the growth caused higher price level and required more devaluation. This made the agents get used to devaluation, factor further devaluation, and renew inflation into their expectations.
One way to solve this cycle of depreciation, inflation and then more depreciation is to announce an explicit policy rule to target the exchange rate. Recent literature on monetary policies has indicated that the key to lowering expected inflation is to build a reputation for price stability. The mechanism by which this can be achieved is to propose a formal rule that eliminates policymakers' discretion to inflate. context of an open-economy model. Finally, the policy rule used is derived from the optimal solution of a dynamic programming problem. The evaluation of the rule is conducted by using statistical simulations of the economy. The performance of the policy rule is gauged by comparing the inflation rates and real GDP growth rates in the simulated and the historical data.
Model and Methodology
The objective function is a quadratic loss function that penalizes deviations of the target variables from their target values. Since the effect of monetary policy on prices or output occurs with considerably more delay than that on a financial variable, using a financial variable as an intermediate target could provide an earlier signal that policy has deviated from the goals. Specifically, the central bank's objective is to minimize: Equations (2)- (7) are estimated by 3SLS. The estimated structural coefficients all have expected signs. In addition, most of the estimates are significantly different from zero at the 10% level except the interest rate and exchange rate in equation (3).
Combining (1) with (2)- (7), we express the central bank's control problem as:
subject to
where The problem is to choose the domestic nominal interest rates r 1 , . . ., r T to achieve (8),
given the initial condition Z 0 . By using Bellman's (1957) method of dynamic programming the problem is solved backward [see Chow (1975, ch. 8)] . That is, the last period T is solved first, given the initial condition Z T-1 . Having found the optimal r T , we solve the two-period problem for the last two periods by choosing the optimal r T-1 , contingent on the initial condition Z T-2 , and so on.
Letting T → ∞, the optimal policy rule can be expressed as (a technical Appendix detailing the derivations is available from the authors upon request)
The control variable (r t ) depends only on the predetermined variables.
Substituting the estimated coefficients in (2)- (7) into (10) and simulating over time to get steady state values of the matrices H and G in (10) yield the optimal policy rule. The economy is assumed to face the same set of shocks that actually occurred in the historical period. Therefore the reduced form solutions of the estimated equations, the optimal policy rule, and the historical shocks from the structural model are used to generate the counterfactual data.
We focus on two measures of economic performance that should reflect the concerns of policymakers: the inflation rate and real GDP growth rate. Given the conventional definition of a recession as two quarters of declining GDP, we focus on the two-quarter growth rates of real GDP. Therefore the means and standard deviations of the annual inflation rates and the twoquarter real GDP growth rates over the simulation period are the statistics of particular interest.
To assess the importance of the exchange rate target, we conduct the simulations over various values of w, the penalty weight on the exchange rate target in the loss function (1). By varying the value of w from zero to one, we wish to see how important the external target is relative to the internal target. In particular, we compare the performances of a dual targets rule (w>0) to those of a single monetary target rule (w = 0). (2) and (4)]. However, since the interest rate elasticity of exchange rates is very high (-6.22) , if the variation in exchange rate is not penalized, the adjustments of the interest rates called by economic shocks will significantly affect the exchange rates. For example, a 1% increase in the interest rate will cause a 6.22% drop in the exchange rate. If the exchange rate is not targeted, the effect will be fully transmitted to output and inflation rates. Furthermore, fluctuations in these variables will call for more adjustments of the instrument. This is why the variation in the interest rates is much higher when w = 0.
Simulation results and conclusions
Secondly, compared to the dual targets rule, targeting the money supply alone will cause higher inflation rates. On the other hand, the variance of inflation rates is lower because degrading a domestic nominal anchor will cause price instability. However, the stabilization of the inflation rates requires more rapid adjustments of the interest rate instrument, which results in fluctuations in output growth.
Thirdly, commitment to an explicit policy rule could have stabilized French annual inflation rates. The standard deviation from the single money-targeting rule is about 1% lower than that in the historical data and about 0.3% lower when the exchange rate is targeted.
Finally, compared to the historical data, the single monetary targeting rule causes higher inflation rates. However, if the exchange rate is targeted, the mean annual inflation rate is significantly lowered. Furthermore, the dual targets rules not only produce lower inflation rates than those in the data but also reduce the fluctuations of the inflation rates.
In sum, simulations of the simple macroeconomic model and the policy rules suggest that, compared to the historical policy, the primary benefit of using a policy rule in France is to reduce the inflation rate volatilities. However, short-run real GDP growth rates would be more volatile than they have been over the past fifteen years. 
Z t
' K Z t , subject to (A.2). The matrix K is diagonal with 1-w on the second diagonal element, w on the third, and zeros elsewhere. The problem is to choose r 1 , . . ., r T to achieve the objective, given the initial condition Z 0 . By using Bellman's (1957) method of dynamic programming the problem is solved backward. The following derivations follow those in Chow (1975, ch. 8) .
Consider the problem for the last period T. It is to minimize 
